а какай может быть задржка если электромагнитные импульсы распространяются со скоростью света?
может издержки перевода?
английский оригинал можно выложить?
ИИ указал это маловероятной причиной, на оригинале у меня было два вопроса:1) чисто технический по типу самолета и всем возможным отказам в связи cut off fuel и 2) и второй конкретно по этой авиакасирофе, запросы к ИИ надо готовить, чтобы не постил случайную чушь, поэтому первый вопрос был подготовкой ИИ к строгому анализу
Вот оригиналы вопросов и их формулировка( ответы ии с функциями глубокое размышление+поиск):
Вопрос 1
"cut off fuel on being 787 dreamliner possible causes with 1 second gap of cutting off position. Exclude manual version (human factor) and build all possible scenarios causing such failure"
Based on the investigation details of Air India Flight 171 and technical analysis of Boeing 787 systems, here are possible non-human causes for dual fuel cutoff with a 1-second gap, excluding pilot actions:
###
1. **Automated System Malfunction (Thrust Control Malfunction Accommodation - TCMA)**
- The TCMA software can autonomously cut fuel during perceived engine failures or faults. Erroneous sensor data (e.g., false "ground mode" signal during climb) could trigger simultaneous cutoff commands. A 2019 ANA 787 incident involved automated fuel cutoff during approach due to software misinterpreting flight phase .
- The 1-second gap could result from processing latency between engines.
###
2. **Electrical System Anomalies**
- **Voltage spike or short-circuit**: A transient electrical event (e.g., faulty generator, wiring fault) could disrupt signals to the fuel switch servos. The switches' spring-loaded design requires stable power; a surge might force both to "cutoff" sequentially due to minor differences in circuit resistance .
- **Common-mode failure**: Shared power or data lines for both switches could propagate a fault to both systems within seconds .
###
3. **Sensor or Data Integration Failure**
- **Faulty weight-on-wheels (WoW) sensors**: If incorrectly signaling "ground" during takeoff, the aircraft's systems might initiate automated shutdown procedures. Corroded or misaligned sensors could affect both engines nearly simultaneously .
- **FADEC (Full Authority Digital Engine Control) error**: Dual FADEC units might process erroneous data (e.g., false "engine overspeed" or fire warning), triggering coordinated cutoff. Redundancy failures could bypass safeguards .
###
4. **Electromagnetic Interference (EMI)**
- High-energy EMI from ground systems or onboard avionics could induce current in fuel switch wiring, simulating a cutoff command. The 1-second interval might reflect propagation delay through shielded circuits .
###
5. **Design/Manufacturing Defects in Fuel Switch Assembly**
- **Locking mechanism failure**: The 2018 FAA bulletin noted some Boeing models had fuel switches installed with disengaged locks, allowing inadvertent movement. Vibration during takeoff could jolt both switches to cutoff if locks were defective .
- **Common mounting plate issue**: Switches are co-located on a shared module. A single mechanical fault (e.g., fractured bracket) might displace both switches sequentially under g-forces .
###
Key Investigative Findings Supporting These Scenarios:
- No mechanical faults were initially found in engines/fuel systems .
- FAA/Boeing confirmed switch safety but acknowledged past locking-feature advisories .
- Ram Air Turbine deployment confirmed dual-engine power loss was instantaneous .
### Table: Key Failure Modes and Supporting Evidence
| **Failure Mode** | **Mechanism** | **Evidence from Investigation** |
|------------------|---------------|--------------------------------|
| **TCMA Software Glitch** | Erroneous ground mode detection triggering fuel cutoff | 2019 ANA incident; mandated safety system |
| **Electrical Anomaly** | Voltage spike disrupting switch signals | Switches require stable power; found in "RUN" post-crash |
| **Sensor Fault** | Faulty WoW sensors causing shutdown sequence | Common in automated systems; ruled out contamination |
| **EMI** | Induced current simulating cutoff command | Switches centrally located; sensitive electronics |
| **Design Defect** | Disengaged locking mechanisms allowing movement | 2018 FAA bulletin; no mandatory inspection |
### Conclusion
The 1-second gap suggests a systemic or synchronized failure rather than random events. Prioritized areas for investigation include:
- Reviewing FADEC/TCMA software logs for erroneous commands.
- Testing electrical grounding and EMI shielding at Ahmedabad Airport.
- Inspecting switch locking mechanisms fleet-wide (post-crash checks by airlines found no issues, but design flaws remain plausible) .
The AAIB’s final report must address these automated and systemic factors to exclude technical causes definitively .
–—————-
Вопрос 2
"which is most probable cause you think In particular for air India case?"
Based on the evidence from the preliminary report and technical analysis of the Boeing 787 systems, the **most probable cause** of the Air India Flight 171 crash is a **technical malfunction in the aircraft's automated fuel management system**, specifically the **Thrust Control Malfunction Accommodation (TCMA) software**. This conclusion is supported by the following evidence and reasoning:
###
1. **TCMA Software Malfunction (Highest Probability)**
- The TCMA system, mandated by the FAA, is designed to automatically cut fuel during perceived engine failures or ground-mode errors. In the Air India case, it likely misinterpreted flight data (e.g., false "ground mode" signal during climb) and triggered a dual fuel cutoff without pilot input .
- **Precedent**: In 2019, an All Nippon Airways (ANA) 787 experienced an identical TCMA-induced fuel cutoff during final approach. The software erroneously thought the aircraft had landed, shutting off fuel mid-flight .
- **Alignment with Evidence**:
- The 1-second gap between switch movements matches automated processing latency, not manual operation (which typically takes longer per switch due to the two-step locking mechanism) .
- Pilots denied activating the switches, with the CVR capturing confusion: *"Why did you cut off?" / "I didn’t"* .
###
2. **Why Human or Mechanical Causes Are Less Likely**
- **Human Error/Sabotage**:
- **Unlikely**: The fuel switches require deliberate physical action (pull-up + flip), making accidental activation improbable . Sabotage is unsupported by pilot profiles (no mental health issues, clear motives) or CVR evidence of struggle .
- **Contradiction**: If a pilot intentionally cut fuel, restarting engines seconds later is illogical. The captain (monitoring pilot) was implicated by some reports, but his actions align with emergency response, not intent .
- **Mechanical Defect**:
- The FAA’s 2018 bulletin noted fuel switches could be installed with disengaged locks, allowing inadvertent movement. However, Boeing/FAA reiterated the 787’s switches are "safe" post-crash, and no fleet-wide issues were found .
- No evidence of wiring faults or voltage spikes was found in the wreckage .
###
3. **Supporting Technical Indicators**
- **Ram Air Turbine (RAT) Deployment**: Activated immediately after takeoff, confirming dual-engine power loss .
- **Engine Recovery Sequence**: Automated relight attempts began when switches returned to "RUN," but insufficient altitude prevented recovery .
- **Landing Gear Position**: Gear remained down, consistent with low-altitude emergencies where pilots prioritize flight path over configuration .
###
Conclusion
The **TCMA software malfunction** is the most probable cause due to:
1. **Historical precedent** (ANA 2019 incident),
2. **System capability** to autonomously cut fuel,
3. **Pilots’ corroborated confusion**, and
4. **Technical evidence** (RAT deployment, 1-second gap).
While human factors cannot be fully excluded until the final report (due by June 2026), the automated system error aligns best with the known facts. This highlights critical risks in over-reliance on automation during high-stakes flight phases like takeoff .
**Recommendation**: Investigators should prioritize reviewing FADEC/TCMA software logs and validating sensor inputs to prevent future incidents.